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INTRODUCTION 
In Padilla v. Kentucky,1 a lawyer misadvised his client.  He stated 
that the client did not need to worry about deportation when pleading 
guilty to a drug distribution offense.  When the government subse-
quently initiated deportation proceedings, the client moved to vacate 
the underlying criminal conviction on the ground of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.  The Supreme Court held that, under the circum-
stances presented, the lawyer had a duty to correctly advise his client 
about the deportation consequences of a conviction. 
The obvious question is, how far will the Court’s holding in Padilla 
extend?  Some argue that it has started a revolution, fundamentally 
altering the concept of the criminal sentence and eradicating the dis-
tinction between direct and collateral consequences.  Others contend 
that Padilla is likely to alter very little because the opinion is narrow, 
 
* Ms. Brink serves as counsel for the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers and as a Lecturer in Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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the consequence of non-compliance is small, and the workload of the 
criminal defense bar, or at least the indigent defense bar, is already 
unmanageable. 
I assert that the power to determine the long-term meaning of Pa-
dilla lies primarily with the defense bar.  If defense lawyers, particu-
larly public defenders and court-appointed counsel, become mired in 
skepticism about the time and resources needed to fulfill the letter, no 
less the spirit, of the Padilla decision, the decision may change very 
little.  If instead they embrace Padilla and utilize its mandate as a tool 
to fight for the resources necessary to provide each client with effec-
tive representation, the effect could be transformational.  The defense 
bar must be at the forefront, arguing for a broad interpretation of Pa-
dilla, embracing the duty to warn each client of all of the severe con-
sequences of his potential conviction and, further, utilizing this infor-
mation together with information about the client’s life and goals to 
achieve the best outcome for that individual. 
The first section of this Article analyzes the Padilla case, demon-
strating that the decision does require defense lawyers affirmatively 
to advise clients of the applicability of a large segment of collateral 
consequences, as well as provide detailed information about other po-
tentially applicable collateral consequences.  Part II discusses how 
Padilla’s focus on the importance of a consequence to a client has the 
potential to transform the defense function.  Part III examines 
whether hurdles to the implementation of Padilla, particularly the cri-
sis in indigent defense, will curtail this transformation and outlines 
how Padilla, in fact, can particularly assist public defense lawyers to 
obtain greater resources. 
I.  THE MEANING OF PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 
Padilla v. Kentucky concerned a man who had been a lawful per-
manent resident of the United States for over forty years, including 
serving as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces.2  Mr. Padilla pled 
guilty to drug distribution charges after his lawyer assured him that 
because he had been legally in the United States for so long, he did 
not need to worry about deportation as a consequence of conviction.3  
 
 2. Id. at 1477. 
 3. Id. at 1478. 
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In reality, after Padilla entered a guilty plea to drug distribution, his 
deportation was virtually automatic.4 
Once deportation proceedings were initiated, Mr. Padilla chal-
lenged his drug distribution conviction, asserting that absent his coun-
sel’s erroneous advice about deportation, he would not have pled 
guilty.5  The Supreme Court held that Mr. Padilla’s attorney had a du-
ty under the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
to provide his client with correct advice on his likelihood of being de-
ported.6 
There is no doubt that Padilla broke new ground.  Until the Padilla 
decision, the vast majority of courts across the county held that de-
fense lawyers had no affirmative duty to inform a client about the col-
lateral consequences of a plea.7  In other words, the defense lawyer’s 
sole responsibility was the potential sentence to be handed down in a 
criminal case.  Any other impact the conviction might have, whether 
on housing, employment, child custody, or even lifetime registration 
with the police, was not the purview or obligation of the defense law-
yer.  While some courts had held that a lawyer has a duty not to pro-
vide inaccurate advice,8 no federal court had held that the defense 
lawyer has an affirmative duty to provide correct advice.9  Until Pa-
dilla, silence or even “I don’t know” was sufficient—a reality that re-
sulted in a defense culture of not providing information regarding col-
lateral consequences despite practice standards that required this 
advice.10 
 
 4. Id. at 1477 n.1 (“Padilla’s crime, like virtually every drug offense except for 
only the most insignificant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).”). 
 5. Id. at 1478. 
 6. Id. at 1483 (“This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The conse-
quences of Padilla’s plea could easily be determined from reading the removal stat-
ute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was in-
correct.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005); Common-
wealth v. Fromenta, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989); see also Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Ef-
fectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence and Misinformation in the Guilty 
Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 131–32 (2009).   
 8. See, e.g., Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988); Cepulonis v. 
Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Roberts, supra note 7, at 135–40 
(discussing the affirmative misadvice exception to the collateral consequences rule). 
 9. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 132 (citing Brief for Criminal and Immigration 
Law Professors et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–12, Padilla v. Ken-
tucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 164242 (noting that all federal 
courts and most state high courts adhere to the collateral consequences rule)). 
 10. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 125–26. 
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Still, the full meaning of the Court’s decision in Padilla is far from 
clear.  The Court’s rationale could be read very broadly or very nar-
rowly, and the decision itself appears internally inconsistent.11  On 
one hand, the Court rejects the position that only direct consequences 
are relevant under the Sixth Amendment: “We . . . have never applied 
a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the 
scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required 
under Strickland[.]”12  Focusing on this pronouncement, many assert 
that Padilla is a revolution, eradicating the formalistic distinction be-
tween direct and collateral consequences and fundamentally altering 
the concept of the criminal sentence.13 
On the other hand, the Padilla holding only addresses deportation, 
and the Court specifically distinguishes deportation from other “col-
lateral” consequences.  “Deportation as a consequence of a criminal 
conviction is . . . uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a col-
lateral consequence.  The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-
suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of 
deportation.”14  Further, the Court is careful to note that its holding 
does not extend to all deportation situations, but only to those where 
“the law is . . . succinct and straightforward.”15  The Court emphasizes 
that Mr. Padilla’s counsel had a duty to advise his client correctly be-
cause the inevitability of deportation was obvious from the plain lan-
guage of the statute.16  In this way, Justice Steven’s majority opinion 
suggests that the decision is carefully circumscribed. 
To predict the likely impact of Padilla, one has to scrutinize care-
fully the Court’s analysis.  In reaching its conclusion that the defense 
lawyer had a duty to provide correct advice on deportation to Mr. 
Padilla, the Court relied on a couple of factors, namely: (1) “deporta-
tion is a particularly severe penalty;” and that (2) deportation is “in-
timately related to the criminal process,” i.e., it is “nearly an automat-
 
 11. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1461, 1481 (2011) (noting that the majority opinion “seems to vacillate” among three 
positions about the direct-versus-collateral distinction). 
 12. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 
 13. See McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”:  The Seismic Evolu-
tion of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 
HOW. L.J. 795, 798–808 (2011) (describing Padilla as a revolution).   
 14. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
 15. Id. at 1483. 
 16. Id. 
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ic result” of conviction.17  The Court then went on to say that for a 
circumstance to require correct advice, the application of the conse-
quence to the particular defendant’s case must be clear.18 
A. The Key Factors: Severity and Automatic Application 
Looking at the set of factors that the Court identified in the first 
part of the Padilla analysis, those who favor a broad interpretation 
appear to have the better argument.  The Court’s reasoning with re-
gard to deportation could equally apply to a variety of collateral con-
sequences.19  As one commentator observed, the Court’s “invocation 
of ‘uniqueness’ [with regard to deportation] rings hollow . . . .  Noth-
ing about th[e] explanation of deportation’s ‘uniqueness’ limited the 
analysis to immigration penalties.”20 
Many collateral consequences, from sex offender registration, to 
loss of child custody, to the termination of food and housing assis-
tance benefits, are severe.21  Like deportation, these consequences 
may be as important to the client as the criminal sentence itself, if not 
more so.22  It is not difficult to imagine an individual who would be 
willing to plead guilty if it would result in spending some time in jail, 
but who would not be willing to enter the same plea if it would result 
 
 17. Id. at 1481 (citations omitted); see also Sixth Amendment—Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 124 HARV. L. REV 199, 206–07 (2010) (discussing two factors by 
which the Court determined deportation was unique). 
 18. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 19. In the aftermath of Padilla, the appropriate use of the term “collateral conse-
quences” is very much in question.  Some suggest that the term is outdated and 
should be replaced by a term that does not relegate these consequences to a second-
ary status. See Smyth, supra note 13, at 825 (recommending the term “enmeshed 
penalties”).  I continue to use the term “collateral consequences” to mean any conse-
quence of a conviction that is not the actual criminal sentence for the offense. 
 20. Smyth, supra note 13, at 801.  Professor Gabriel Chin, arguably the leading 
academic scholar on the subject of “collateral” consequences, concurs in this assess-
ment. See Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical:  Defense Counsel and Collateral 
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 675–76 (2011) (“Padilla’s clear impli-
cation is that defense attorneys should warn clients about other serious consequenc-
es—the ‘collateral consequences’—that flow automatically from a criminal convic-
tion, even if they are not technically denominated criminal punishment.”). 
 21. See Joanna Woolman, Padilla’s “Truly Clear” Test:  A Case for a Broader 
Application in Minnesota, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 840, 848 (2011) (arguing that 
restrictions on child custody, disqualification from employment licensing, and sex of-
fender registration should be considered severe); Smyth, supra note 13, at 824–25 
(reviewing severe penalties).  
 22. See, e.g., Woolman, supra note 21, at 849–54 (describing the impact of par-
ticular collateral consequences on specific exemplar clients). 
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in the termination of his professional license23 or exclusion from living 
in subsidized housing with his family when he is released.24  Similarly, 
it is easy to imagine a college student happy to accept a plea to proba-
tion for a minor charge of drug possession, until she learns that ac-
cepting the plea will result in the immediate termination of her finan-
cial aid.25 
Moreover, like deportation, most collateral consequences are “in-
timately related to the criminal process”26 in that criminal conviction 
automatically triggers the consequences.  There is no discretion in-
volved in the application of the consequence, meaning that there is no 
separate procedure for determining whether the consequence is ap-
propriate or necessary in a particular case.  Consider the hypothetical 
of the student arrested for drug possession.  Regardless of whether 
the student pleads to a misdemeanor or a felony, under the Drug Free 
Student Loan Act of 1988, she will lose her federal financial aid if she 
is convicted of drug possession.27  There is no process for argument or 
appeal.  So, like the deportation statute at issue in Padilla, the appli-
cation of the consequence in this example is automatic and, therefore, 
tied to the criminal proceeding. 
Measuring other collateral consequences against these two factors 
of severity and nondiscretionary application, it seems clear that many 
would meet this Padilla test.  Indeed, in the short time since the Pa-
dilla decision, a number of courts have reviewed other collateral con-
sequences and found them to be equally as “unique” as deportation.  
These courts have expanded Padilla to include failures by counsel to 
 
 23. See, e.g., THE REENTRY OF EX-OFFENDERS CLINIC, UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF 
LAW, A REPORT ON THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN 
MARYLAND 22–27 (2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/ 
publications/cc_report2007.pdf (examining a range of professional licenses that can 
be impacted by criminal convictions in Maryland); Woolman, supra note 21, at 851–
52 (discussing the impact of a criminal conviction on licensing by the Department of 
Health and Human Services in Minnesota). 
 24. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 960.203 (2010) (requiring local public housing authorities 
to promulgate regulations that exclude individuals from housing if convicted of cer-
tain offenses).  
 25. See Drug Free Student Loans Act of 1998, 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2010). 
 26. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010). 
 27. Id.  The impact of these consequences is noteworthy.  With regard to this par-
ticular example, according to Students for Sensible Drug Policy, “over 200,000 stu-
dents have been ineligible for federal loans, grants, and work-study because of” this 
law. The Higher Education Act, STUDENTS FOR SENSIBLE DRUG POLICY, 
http://ssdp.org/campaigns/the-higher-education-act. 
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advise clients about sex offender registration,28 mandatory lifetime 
supervision,29 and other consequences typically viewed as collateral to 
the criminal proceeding, such as revocation of vested pension bene-
fits.30  In so doing, the courts have emphasized that the consequences 
involved are harsh and that their application is automatic.  For exam-
ple, in Commonwealth v. Arnold, a Pennsylvania appellate court not-
ed, 
Because of the automatic nature of forfeiture, the punitive nature of 
the consequence, and the fact that only criminal behavior triggers 
forfeiture, [it] is, like deportation, intimately connected to the crimi-
nal process.  Therefore, counsel was obliged to warn his client of the 
loss of pension as a consequence of pleading guilty.31 
These cases provide a reason to be optimistic that the holding of Pa-
dilla will extend, at a minimum, to other collateral consequences that 
have potentially dire effects on a client’s life. 
B. Clarity and the Level of Advice Required 
The second part of the analysis undertaken by the Court is the 
more interesting because it relates to the level of advice required 
when a collateral consequence meets the two factor test.  The Court, 
 
 28. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. 2010) (holding that failing 
to advise a client on mandatory sex offender registration program constitutes defi-
cient performance of counsel); State v. Fonville, No. 294554, 2011 WL 222127, at *10 
(Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2011) (holding that counsel’s failure to warn client of sex of-
fender registration requirement was constitutionally defective).  
 29. See Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 491–92 (Tenn. 2011) (holding that coun-
sel’s failure to warn a defendant about mandatory lifetime community supervision 
constituted deficient performance). 
 30. See Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090, 1091–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2010) (applying Padilla to conclude that forfeiture of vested pension benefits is a col-
lateral consequence about which the attorney had a duty to warn), appeal granted by 
9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 2010).  
 31. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1094–95.  By contrast, few courts have proven willing 
to dismiss Padilla as applicable only to immigration.  In United States v. Bakilana, for 
example, a district court addressed whether failure to warn about potential civil lia-
bility constituted ineffective assistance. No. 1:10-cr-00093 (LMB), 2010 WL 4007608 
(E.D. Va. Oct 12, 2010).  Addressing Padilla only briefly, the court suggested that the 
case might apply only to immigration, but went on to at least analyze the conse-
quence under the factors set forth in Padilla. Id. at *3 n.2 (“Potential damages liabil-
ity in a civil suit by a victim simply does not rise to the same level as deportation in 
terms of its pervasive effects on a defendant’s life.  For that reason, the holding in 
Padilla does not undermine the validity of the plea colloquy in this case.”). But see 
Brown v. Goodwin, Civ. No. 09-211(RMB), 2010 WL 1930574, at *13 (D.N.J. May 11, 
2010) (“[T]he holding of Padilla seems not importable—either entirely or, at the very 
least, not readily importable—into scenarios involving collateral consequences other 
than deportation.”).  
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apparently fearful of placing too onerous a burden on the defense 
lawyer, limits the affirmative duty to advise clients on the likelihood 
of collateral consequences where that likelihood can be “easily de-
termined.”32  Specifically, the Court states, 
Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its 
own . . . .  There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations 
in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are un-
clear or uncertain.  The duty of the private practitioner in such cases 
is more limited.  When the law is not succinct and straightfor-
ward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a 
noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of 
adverse immigration consequences.33 
The interpretation of this factor is critical to the potential reach of 
Padilla.  If this limitation means that a defense attorney has no af-
firmative duty to advise whenever the burden of locating and advising 
on the consequences of conviction is taxing, then Padilla would likely 
mean very little. 
Indeed this interpretation is being pursued in some jurisdictions.  
For example, in the United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona, some plea agreements now contain generic provisions re-
garding warnings about potential immigration consequences, ostensi-
bly in an effort to satisfy the requirements of Padilla.  One such 
agreement states: 
Defendant recognizes that pleading guilty may have consequences 
with respect to the defendant’s immigration status if the defendant is 
not a citizen of the United States.  Under federal law, a broad range 
of crimes are removable offenses, including the offense(s) to which 
the defendant is pleading guilty.  Removal and other immigration 
consequences are subject to a separate proceeding, however, de-
fendant understands that no one, including the defendant’s attorney 
or the district court, can predict to a certainty the effect of the de-
fendant’s conviction on the defendant’s immigration status.  De-
fendant nevertheless affirms that the defendant wants to plead guilty 
regardless of any immigration consequences that the defendant’s 
plea may entail, even if the consequence is the defendant’s automat-
ic removal from the United States.34 
Such a warning, particularly delivered in the course of the plea docu-
ment, is useless to a client. 
 
 32. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Plea Agreement at 3, United States v. Shirley, No. 10-8135M (BPV) (D. Ariz. 
Aug. 13, 2010) (on file with the author). 
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A careful reading of the Court’s analysis shows that interpreting 
Padilla to permit such general warnings is incorrect.  Padilla requires 
individualized advice whenever that advice can be clear.  And when 
there is some ambiguity or lack of clarity in the applicability of a par-
ticular severe consequence in a client’s case, Padilla still requires that 
the lawyer provide an individualized assessment of the consequence, 
explaining not only the nature of the consequence, but also why its 
operation is ambiguous in the client’s case. 
In creating the limitation regarding clarity, the Court was not con-
cerned with the temporal or research burden of locating the conse-
quences that might apply, but rather with the legal analysis of wheth-
er, if the statute or rule is not clear, the consequence would apply in 
the defendant’s particular case.  The Court did not say that the com-
plexity of immigration law excuses the defense lawyer from reading 
the law or attempting to determine its particular applicability to the 
defendant’s situation.  To the contrary, the Court’s decision specifi-
cally faults Mr. Padilla’s lawyer for not having researched and read 
the immigration statute, emphasizing that its applicability to Mr. Pa-
dilla was obvious: “Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined 
that his plea would make him eligible for deportation simply from 
reading the text of the statute.”35 
The lawyer must locate and read about the consequence because it 
is only through that process a lawyer can determine if the conse-
quence’s application in a particular case is clear.  If, but only if, the 
application to a defendant’s particular set of circumstances “is not 
succinct and straightforward,”36 that defense lawyer can satisfy the 
minimal standard of effective assistance by providing less than direct 
advice on the actual applicability of the consequence to the particular 
defendant.  In other words, the onerous burden on defense counsel 
that concerned the Court was not the burden of searching out the 
consequences and reading the statutes, code or rules that contain 
them.  Rather, the burden on defense counsel arises from understand-
ing when those rules would apply to a particular plea if, for example, 
the rule in question uses a construction or set of definitions that is not 
yet clear or would be unfamiliar to a criminal defense lawyer. 
This interpretation makes sense in light of collateral consequence 
statutes.  Often, these statutes are constructed in a way that would be 
very familiar to defense lawyers.  For example, felony convictions 
trigger a number of collateral consequences.  Florida’s voter registra-
 
 35. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. 
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tion law provides that a person may not register to vote if he “has 
been convicted of any felony by any court of record.”37  A criminal 
defense lawyer can be expected to understand this distinction and, 
therefore, can be required to affirmatively and accurately advise her 
client about the application of this type of consequence in the client’s 
particular case. 
By contrast, some consequences are automatically triggered by a 
smaller range of convictions, the definition of which may be more dif-
ficult for a criminal defense lawyer to determine.  In the immigration 
context, a conviction for certain types of crimes triggers automatic 
deportation, such as the drug offense at issue in Padilla.38  But there 
are many other crimes for which the immigration consequences are 
far less clear.  A noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral tur-
pitude (that is not one of the subset of automatically deportable of-
fenses) is deportable only if: (1) the conviction carries a maximum 
sentence of at least one year and is committed within five years of the 
individual’s admission to the United States; or (2) the individual was 
previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.  The defi-
nition of crime of moral turpitude differs by jurisdiction and pur-
pose.39  For the purpose of deportation, it is the federal immigration 
case law that controls, and state convictions must be “translated” into 
this federal rubric.40  Given these more complicated circumstances, 
under Padilla, a defense lawyer representing a noncitizen offered a 
plea to theft with a two year sentence would likely not be required to 
provide specific advice.  According to Padilla, a more “general warn-
ing” would suffice.41  But a general warning that endeavors to evade 
 
 37. FLA. STAT. § 97.041 (2009). 
 38. Other crimes for which a conviction constitutes immediate grounds for depor-
tation include domestic violence, child abuse, stalking, and any aggravated felony. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2010). 
 39. See, e.g., Stidwell v. Md. St. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 799 A.2d 444, 447 
(Md. 2002) (distinguishing the definition of moral turpitude in the criminal context 
from the definition in the administrative context, noting “while Maryland’s adminis-
trative and regulatory statutes repeatedly use the phrase ‘moral turpitude,’ that use is 
variable and inconsistent . . .”). 
 40. See, e.g., Quick Reference Chart for Determining Immigration Consequences 
of Common New York Offices, IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT, http://immigrant 
defenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/06_QuickReferenceChartforNew 
YorkStateOffenses.pdf (noting whether certain offenses under New York state law 
constitute a crime of moral turpitude under federal immigration law). 
 41. Padilla, 130 S. Ct at 1483 (“When the law is not succinct and straightforward . . 
. a criminal defense attorney need to no more than advise a noncitizen client that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”).  
Indeed, the example of crimes of moral turpitude definition was specifically raised by 
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the requirement that the defense lawyer research the consequences 
and, to the extent possible, determine their applicability to the client, 
would obviously still fall far short of this standard. 
Under Padilla, the duty of the criminal defense lawyer is broad.  
She must research all severe collateral consequences that would au-
tomatically apply to the defendant as a result of a potential plea.  
These collateral consequences are not limited to deportation or even 
immigration issues, but to any consequence that is punitive and criti-
cal to the client and whose application is nondiscretionary.  Where 
the applicability of the collateral consequence is obvious from the re-
search, the lawyer must specifically advise the client on how the con-
sequence will apply.  Where the applicability is not clear, the lawyer 
must explain the consequence to the client, and, noting the lack of 
clarity regarding its applicability in a particular case, warn the client 
about the potential for the consequence to apply. 
II.  THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF PADILLA 
The logical extension of the Padilla analysis to other collateral con-
sequences unnerves many in the defense community, to whom the 
idea of identifying all collateral consequences alone, no less determin-
ing their applicability in every client’s case, sounds daunting.  This 
concern is understandable given the state of the law and defense prac-
tice pre-Padilla.  Although practice standards had long declared that 
lawyers should advise their clients of the applicability of collateral 
consequences,42 Padilla came as a shock to the defense community.  
Leading commentators in the area of collateral consequences called 
the decision surprising, even for those who had been following the 
case closely.43  Why?  In many jurisdictions prior to Padilla, misadvice 
 
Justice Alito as an example of an instance in which the immigration consequence 
might not be clear. Id. at 1489.  The Majority responded by noting that many of Jus-
tice Alito’s examples were times when a more general warning would prove suffi-
cient. Id. at 1483. 
 42. See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, Standard 14-
3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999) (“To the extent possible, defense counsel should determine and 
advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possi-
ble collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated plea.”); 
see also Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et. al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at *9–22, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 
(2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1567356 at *9–22 (discussing obligations under profes-
sional and ethical standards to research and warn clients regarding possible immigra-
tion consequences of a conviction). 
 43. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky:  The 
Right to Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 34 CHAMPION 18, 
19 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1591264. 
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was viewed as ineffective assistance, while failing to advise was 
viewed as acceptable.44  The culture of much of the defense communi-
ty was to affirmatively avoid providing advice on immigration conse-
quences, and indeed collateral consequences generally.  Advising in-
correctly could get a defense attorney in trouble, but saying nothing 
would not; so why try to advise?45  Moreover, most defense lawyers 
are constrained by significant limitations on the amount of time they 
can devote to a particular case.  Public defenders are required to car-
ry a certain caseload, and court-appointed counsel and even attorneys 
retained by most non-indigent clients are compensated for only a lim-
ited amount of work.  In the circumstance of limited resources, one 
has to prioritize.  Between the risk that erroneous advice would cause 
trouble and the perceived secondary importance of collateral conse-
quences, research regarding the applicability of collateral conse-
quences was kicked off the “to do” list, despite their increasing num-
ber and impact on clients.  The system actively dissuaded defense 
lawyers from investigating the applicability of collateral consequences 
to their clients, and the norm for most defense lawyers became not to 
do so. 
Very few people recognized the dramatic shift that this decision to 
ignore collateral consequences signified.  The limitation on the scope 
of representation that the collateral consequence doctrine created 
was fundamentally inconsistent with the role of the defense lawyer.  
A fundamental principle of lawyering is that the client should be the 
lawyer’s focus and sole concern.46  In no specialty is this more of a 
tradition than in criminal defense.  As Henry Lord Brougham stated 
in his defense of Queen Caroline, “an advocate, in the discharge of 
his duty, knows but one person in all the world and that person in his 
 
 44. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 140 (“Judicial decisions that incorporate the col-
lateral-consequences rule and the affirmative-misadvice exception deliver the follow-
ing message to lawyers and judges: it is better to say nothing than take the risk of say-
ing something wrong. . . .”). 
 46. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (“A lawyer should pursue 
a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconven-
ience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to 
vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and 
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s 
behalf.”), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility 
/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_3_diligence/comment_on
_rule_1_3.html. 
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client.”47  The collateral consequences doctrine chipped away at this 
first principle.  By making silence the safest course of action, it creat-
ed a de facto limit on the scope of representation provided to criminal 
defendants, which then focused exclusively on the potential sentence 
in the criminal case.48 
Against this backdrop, the importance of the rationale underlying 
Padilla and the power of the decision to bring about transformational 
change is clear.  Padilla is, above all else, a prudential decision.49  It 
tears away the importance previously accorded the formalistic distinc-
tion between collateral consequences and direct consequences in fa-
vor of markedly practical considerations: the level of harm posed to 
the client, the unavoidability of the harm, and the likelihood of appli-
cation in a particular case.50 The Court recognized that there are some 
consequences of a conviction that may be more important to the cli-
ent than the criminal sanction and, giving credence to the client in this 
regard, required that the attorney research those consequences and 
explain them.  By prioritizing the importance to and impact on the 
client above the formal divide between the criminal case and its col-
lateral consequences, Padilla can and should motivate a return to first 
principles and a shift toward client-centered defense. 
But practically, what does the implementation of Padilla mean?  
Many fear that it will drown defense lawyers in obscure code and ad-
ministrative law research as they try to identify applicable collateral 
consequences.  This interpretation underestimates Padilla’s pragma-
tism and overlooks the emphasis that Padilla places on the im-
portance of the consequence to a defendant.  Padilla is first and fore-
most a mandate to get to know one’s client.  The only way to 
determine which collateral consequences might apply and which 
might be important to the client is to ask the client.  After Padilla, it is 
 
 47. Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to 
Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
771, 771 (2006) (citing 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 3 (1821)). 
 48.  In so doing, the collateral consequences doctrine arguably also exacerbated 
the disparity between the representation received by the poor and the representation 
received by the wealthy.  A small subset of criminal defendants, who recognized for 
themselves the importance of collateral consequences and who could afford to pay, 
could demand and receive comprehensive representation.  For example, a stock bro-
ker charged with insider trading who was concerned about his license might ask for 
and receive the information.  But for most criminal defendants who did not know to 
ask the question and/or could not afford to pay for the answers, representation was 
limited to that which had the potential to impact the criminal sanction. 
 49. Smyth, supra note 13, at 806–09. 
 50. Id. 
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no longer sufficient to limit one’s knowledge to where the defendant 
was at the time of the alleged offense.  The defense lawyer must know 
where and with whom the defendant lives, where the defendant 
works, and the defendant’s goals.  Only by knowing this information 
can a defense lawyer know whether the criminal case may implicate 
limitations on housing, child custody, licenses, or loans.  In this way, 
the starting point that Padilla requires is not obscure research.  Ra-
ther, a defense lawyer should begin by having a conversation with the 
client that goes beyond the plea that he or she is willing to accept.  
Ideally, having information specific to the client’s case and needs 
would lead in turn to very focused research. 
III.  PADILLA AND HURDLES TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION 
There is much skepticism, even from within the defense communi-
ty, about Padilla’s ability to bring about transformative change.  Some 
have noted that, despite its pragmatic analysis, Padilla may lack 
pragmatic effect.  Some believe that assessing even the most signifi-
cant consequences of every client’s potential conviction is simply im-
possible, particularly for public defenders and court-appointed coun-
sel.  Indeed, some believe that defense lawyers are unable to give full 
meaning to Padilla with regard to the severe collateral consequences 
of a conviction, including but not limited to the impact on immigra-
tion status. 
A. Duty Without Prejudice: What is a Right Without a Remedy? 
In his article Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), Professor Darryl 
Brown asserts that Padilla’s implementation will be limited because 
the decision does not require defense attorneys to act on the infor-
mation they gather, and a claim of ineffective assistance does not pro-
vide an effective mechanism for ensuring compliance.51  While I agree 
with Professor Brown that Padilla will not guarantee better results for 
clients, I believe he underestimates both the magnitude of the shift 
that Padilla demands and the power of a statement by the Supreme 
Court that a particular practice is constitutionally required. 
Raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland 
v. Washington52 is a fruitless means of compelling compliance with 
 
 51. Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 59 UCLA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 12–15), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1792529. 
 52. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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professional norms.53  Requiring a showing of prejudice means that 
most attorney errors will not be redressed.  Moreover, the purpose of 
Strickland is not to provide a remedy that compels compliance with 
practice norms, but rather only to redress those specific cases where 
such errors raise sufficient doubt about the fairness of the outcome.54 
This limitation does not mean, however, that the Court’s declarations 
regarding practices that do not meet constitutional standards of effec-
tive assistance have no utility.  The inability to enforce a duty through 
a particular means is hardly a reason not to articulate the duty in the 
first place.  And judicial decisions, particularly those of the United 
States Supreme Court, can send a powerful message to the legal 
community regarding expectations.  Few lawyers would choose to ig-
nore a court-pronounced duty, even if the potential for reversal or 
even acknowledgment of the error, is low.  Indeed, the furor over Pa-
dilla is itself evidence of this effect.  Defense lawyers, public and pri-
vate, are concerned about compliance.  They are worried about trying 
to meet the articulated standard, even though the circumstances un-
der which failing to meet the standard would cause reversal have not 
yet been settled. 
B. Padilla and the Indigent Defense Crisis 
Professor Brown further charges that the implementation of Pa-
dilla is dependent upon resources and that Padilla is, in essence, an 
unfunded mandate that the indigent defense community cannot af-
ford.55  While I agree with Professor Brown regarding the relevance 
of the indigent defense crisis to the implementation of Padilla, I do 
not agree with his conclusion.  To the contrary, I believe that Padilla 
has great potential to facilitate considerable improvement in the area 
of indigent defense. 
 
 53. See generally William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctri-
nal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
91, 120–21 (1995) (detailing the limited review available under habeas).   
 54. Stephen F. Smith, Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel: Taking Strickland 
Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 519 (2009) (“[T]he constitutional ideal of 
effective representation does not seek to improve the quality of representation bar 
members provide . . . .  The Constitution is concerned about the level of competence 
of defense attorneys only to the extent attorney performance threatens the ability of 
the judicial system to reach accurate and reliable results in criminal cases.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 55. Brown, supra note 51, at 12.  
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Approximately 80% of criminal defendants receive appointed 
counsel at state expense.56  Accordingly, the ability of indigent de-
fense systems to implement Padilla will be critical to the decision’s 
long-term impact.  But the indigent defense systems of the United 
States are in crisis.  A recent study by the National Right to Counsel 
Committee summarized the situation: “Throughout the United States, 
indigent defense systems are struggling . . . .  [M]any are truly fail-
ing.”57  The Report attributes many of these problems to inadequate 
funding, noting that “inadequate financial support continues to be the 
single greatest obstacle to delivering ‘competent’ and ‘diligent’ de-
fense representation, as required by the rules of the legal profession, 
and ‘effective assistance,’ as required by the Sixth Amendment.”58 
Acknowledging the crisis, however, is not an excuse for failing to 
implement Padilla any more than the low likelihood of reversal is an 
excuse for failing to establish the duty.  Moreover, it is an error to ac-
cept that defenders have no ability to remediate this crisis.59 Defend-
ers have methodologies for seeking the resources needed to enforce 
Padilla, and the ideological shift authorized by the decision away 
from limited representation to client-centered representation should 
not only further compel them to do so, but also improve their chances 
of success. 
1. Challenging Public Defender Caseloads 
The most obvious result of the underfunding of public defense is 
the “astonishingly large caseloads” that public defense attorneys car-
 
 56. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUN-
SEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.  
This percentage has likely actually increased within the past few years as a result of 
the global financial crisis.  In 2000, when the cited study was published, the percent-
age of the population living below the poverty line was 11.3%; the percentage living 
below the poverty line has since risen to 15.1%. See Don Lee, Record 46.2 Million 
Americans Live in poverty, Census Bureau Says, L.A TIMES BLOG (Sept. 13, 2011 
7:43 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/09/record-462-million-
americans-in-poverty-census-bureau-says.html. 
 57. NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DE-
NIED:  AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUN-
SEL 2 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf. 
 58. Id. at 6–7. 
 59. Id. at 7 (“[D]efense lawyers are constantly forced to violate their oaths as at-
torneys because their caseloads make it impossible for them to practice law as they 
are required to do according to the profession’s rules . . . . Yes, the clients have law-
yers, but lawyers with crushing caseloads who, through no fault of their own, provide 
second-rate legal services, simply because it is not humanly possible for them to do 
otherwise.”). 
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ried.60  For example, in 2008 alone, public defenders in Miami re-
ceived approximately five hundred new felony cases and 2225 new 
misdemeanor cases.61  Other jurisdictions report similarly high case-
loads.62  Assuming a defender works fifty weeks per year, five days 
per week, eight hours per day, that individual defender can devote 
about two thousand hours per year to her caseload.63  To prevent a 
backlog and close the same number of cases she received, that public 
defender in Miami must close a felony every four hours or a misde-
meanor every fifty-four minutes. 
Viewed in this light, the impact of the indigent defense crisis on the 
implementation of Padilla is obvious.  Four hours, and certainly fifty-
four minutes, does not provide the defense lawyer enough time to 
meet with the client, determine what consequences might be applica-
ble in the case, then research those collateral consequences, investi-
gate the underlying allegations, research the applicable law, draft rel-
evant motions, attend preliminary court hearings, confer with the 
prosecutor, and make a plea recommendation.64  And this does not 
even contemplate the possibility that a client would prefer to proceed 
to trial. 
 
 60. Id.; see also Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Crimi-
nal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 1031, 1053 (2006); Steven N. Yermish, 
Ethical Issues in Indigent Defense: The Continuing Crisis of Excessive Caseloads, 33 
CHAMPION 22, 22–23 (2009) (“The ultimate impact of this underfunding crisis is that 
public defenders are saddled with an excessive and unmanageable caseload and lack 
the necessary resources to properly represent their clients.”). 
 61. Eric Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A1. 
 62. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 60, at 1053–59 (citing examples of high 
caseloads across the country); Joy Powell, Minnesota’s Public Defenders Buried By 
Caseloads, MINNEAPOLIS STARTRIBUNE, March 30, 2009, http://www.startribune.com 
/local/south/42060622.html (reporting a mixed felony/misdemeanor caseload of 800 
per attorney); ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, THE 
NAT’L. ASS’N. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE 
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 21 (2009) (reporting 
misdemeanor caseloads of over 2000 per attorney per year in Chicago, Utah, and 
New Orleans). 
 63. In reality, the number of hours available is significantly less.  While this esti-
mation accounts for federal holidays, it does not allow for any vacation time, nor 
does it permit any time to be used for training or administrative responsibilities.  In-
deed, the billable hours requirements at major law firms are generally less than 2000 
per year. See National Association for Law Placement, How Much Do Associates 
Work?  Not All Firms Require 2,000 Billable Hours, NALP BULLETIN (April 2008), 
available at http://www.nalp.org/2008aprbillablehours (showing average billable 
hours requirement at 1887 hours per year).  
 64. See BORUCHOWITZ, BRINK & DIMINO, supra note 62, at 22. 
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But far from justifying the failure to comply with Padilla’s man-
date, these facts demand that public defenders reduce their caseloads 
in order to permit compliance.  Ethical standards require defense at-
torneys, public defenders or otherwise, to take steps to ensure that 
they are not so overburdened as to inhibit their ability to represent 
their clients effectively.65  Under Padilla, the defense lawyer’s mini-
mum obligations now include advising the client on severe collateral 
consequences that will result directly from his or her conviction.  If 
this requirement cannot be met under current caseloads, the ethical 
rules require a defender or defender office to file a motion to cease 
new assignments or, if necessary, to withdraw from pending cases.66 
Public defenders successfully raised claims for caseload reduction 
even before Padilla.67  For example, in Mohave County, Arizona, the 
public defender requested withdrawal from almost one hundred cas-
 
 65. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006) 
(holding that public defenders have a duty to seek a reduction in caseload whenever 
that caseload interferes with their ability to effectively represent their clients); Mon-
roe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 
911, 920 (2005) (“In order to allow zealous investigation and research, defense coun-
sel is forbidden to carry a workload that interferes with th[e] minimum standard of 
competence, or one that might lead to the breach of other professional obligations.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 66. The American Bar Association issued an ethics opinion that specifically ad-
dresses the obligations of a public defender to address a workload that inhibits her 
ability to effectively represent her clients. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006), at 4.  The Opinion states, “If a lawyer believes 
that her workload is such that she is unable to meet the basic ethical obligations re-
quired of her in the representation of a client, she must not continue the representa-
tion of that client or, if representation has not yet begun, she must decline the repre-
sentation.” Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a) (1983)).  The 
Opinion directs the public defender to, upon determining that her workload is exces-
sive, request not to be assigned to any new cases. Id. at 5.  If curtailing the assignment 
of new cases is insufficient to correct the problem, the public defender must request 
to withdraw from a sufficient number of cases to permit effective representation in 
the remaining cases. Id. at 4–5.  Similarly, if a chief public defender determines that 
the entire office is overburdened, the chief public defender must take steps to reduce 
the caseloads of subordinates, including asking that no new cases be assigned to the 
office and, if necessary, that the office be permitted to withdraw from a sufficient 
number of cases to permit effective representation in the remainder. See id. at 7 
(“[T]he supervisor must monitor the workloads of subordinate lawyers to ensure that 
the workload of each lawyer is appropriate . . . .  If any subordinate lawyer’s work-
load is found to be excessive, the supervisor should take whatever additional steps 
are necessary to ensure that the subordinate lawyer is able to meet her ethical obliga-
tions in regard to the representation of her clients.”).    
 67. For a comprehensive review of caseload challenges based on the ABA Ethics 
Opinion, see Norman Lefstein, Securing Reasonable Caseloads: Ethics and Law in 
Public Defense, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (forthcoming 2011). 
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es.68  After a hearing at which the court was presented with caseload 
information and heard testimony from ethics and criminal defense 
experts, the court granted the motion to withdraw, stating: 
The Court has to decide whether the members of the Public De-
fender’s Office can discharge their professional and ethical respon-
sibilities if they are not allowed to withdraw in these cases and 
whether the defendants represented by those attorneys will be de-
nied effective representation of counsel if attorneys are not allowed 
to withdraw . . . . The evidence presented at the hearing leaves the 
court with no doubt whatsoever that the attorneys in the Public De-
fender’s Office cannot continue representing the defendants in these 
cases in light of their already existing caseloads.69 
Unfortunately, despite the obvious applicability of this duty, many 
public defenders have proven reluctant to bring motions to reduce 
their caseloads.70  While it may be naïve to think that this new duty 
would motivate public defenders to take this step when so many other 
duties have not had that effect, the revived focus on the client in Pa-
dilla, even more than the additional duty it creates, provides incredi-
ble support for taking this step. 
One rationale for the failure to seek caseload reductions is that 
these motions can result in a protracted battle that further takes re-
sources away from clients.  It is true that caseload challenges have at 
times proved onerous.  For example, in Miami the public defender 
began an initiative in 2008 to reduce caseloads by curtailing appoint-
ments in noncapital felony cases.71  This effort is still ongoing.72 The 
 
 68. Malia Brink, Indigent Defense, 32 CHAMPION 43, 43 (2008). 
 69. Court Order, Arizona v. Lopez, No. CR-2007-1544, at 11–12 (Dec. 17, 2007) 
(order granting motion to withdraw). 
 70. Eckholm, supra note 61, at A1 (“In my opinion, there should be hundreds of 
[caseload] motions or lawsuits.”) (quoting Norman Lefstein, a renowned expert in 
ethics and indigent defense). 
 71. After a two day evidentiary hearing during which the State Attorney was 
permitted to appear and offer evidence in opposition of the public defender’s motion, 
the trial court granted the request in part. See generally Order Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Public Defender’s Motion to Appoint Other Counsel to Unappoint-
ed Noncapital Felony Cases (Fla. Cir. Ct. 11th Cir. Sept. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.pdmiami.com/Order_on_motion_to_appoint_other_counsel.pdf [herein-
after Unassigned Felony Cases Order] (order granting in part and denying in part 
public defender’s motion to appoint other counsel). 
This Court concludes that the testimonial, documentary, and opinion evi-
dence shows that PD-11’s caseloads are excessive by any reasonable stand-
ard.  As a result, its attorneys are able to provide, at best, minimally compe-
tent representation in their assigned cases.  Further, it is clear that future 
appointments to noncapital felony cases will create a conflict of interest in 
the cases presently handled by PD-11. 
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fact that caseload challenges might be onerous or protracted does not 
alleviate the obligation of an overburdened public defender to pursue 
one.  And it is noteworthy that caseload reduction cases have proven 
difficult to litigate in part because they are not raised as a matter of 
course.  Instead of addressing a minor caseload problem when it aris-
es, public defender offices frequently wait until the problem reaches 
crisis level.  As a result, the remedy they must seek to correct the 
problem likely is extreme and may be difficult for a court to contem-
plate administering. 
The Miami caseload challenge demonstrates perfectly this prob-
lem.  By the time the challenge was brought, caseloads were so ex-
treme that the remedy needed to correct the problem was not merely 
a slowing of the rate of new case assignments or withdrawal from a 
finite number of cases, but a complete bar on appointments of all fel-
onies, save for death penalty cases.  Such a remedy, if granted, poses 
incredible administrative challenges for the court.  Are the conflict of-
fices or court appointed counsel able to absorb a massive influx of 
new appointments?  If not, will the court be forced to bar prosecu-
tions from proceeding due to the absence of counsel?73  If the focus 
on the client in Padilla and the concurrent change in the focus of the 
defense could motivate pursuing these challenges more often to ad-
dress smaller problems, I contend the challenges would be more suc-
cessful. 
 
Id. at 6.  The court then ordered that the public defender be permitted to decline rep-
resentation in low level felony cases, which account for approximately 60% of felony 
filings, but required the office to continue to accept appointments to major felony 
cases. Id. at 4–6.  Since that time, however, the case has been tied up in appeals and 
the order permitting the public defender to decline appointments has been stayed 
pending resolution of the matter by the Florida Supreme Court.  The State Attorney 
appealed the order, which was stayed pending appeal, and the appeal proceeded to 
the State Supreme Court, where it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See State v. 
Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 996 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2008).  The intermedi-
ate appellate court eventually reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court 
had erred in authorizing an office-wide withdrawal from cases. See State v. Pub. De-
fender, 12 So. 3d 798, 802–03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009).  The court held that 
motions to withdraw must be individualized. See id. The Florida Supreme Court 
granted review, and the case is still pending.  Pleadings, including the appellate doc-
uments filed in the Florida Supreme Court, are available on the Public Defender’s 
website, at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Excessive_Workload_ 
Pleadings.htm. 
 72. See Unassigned Felony Cases Order, supra note 71. 
 73. See Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 
2004) (holding that where no counsel was available to represent an indigent defend-
ant, the individual would have to be released and, if no counsel could be found within 
a reasonable period, the charges against the individual would have to be dismissed). 
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2. Padilla’s Relevance to Caseload Challenges 
One might assert that Padilla’s holding, while undoubtedly placing 
additional duties on public defenders, does nothing to impact the 
formation or outcome of caseload challenges.  I would disagree.  The 
indigent defense crisis is reaching a critical phase.  The economic cri-
sis has led to further cuts and increased caseloads.74  Particularly at 
this moment, Padilla, with its remarkable focus on the needs, interests 
and priorities of the clients, should help to compel defenders to do 
what they perhaps should have done long ago: challenge their exces-
sive caseloads. 
If Padilla could motivate more consistent action in this regard, the 
outcome of the cases brought would likely improve.  Caseload chal-
lenges suffer from a failure of uniform action.  One defender chal-
lenges caseloads of five hundred felonies per attorney, while others 
do not.  How is a court to conclude that a particular caseload is exces-
sive, with the cost and administrative burden that it entails for the ju-
risdiction, when in nearby jurisdictions, the public defenders willingly 
accede to the same caseload? 
Moreover, Padilla may help to clarify the appropriate legal stand-
ard in caseload challenges.  The essential elements of caseload chal-
lenges are often debated.  Defenders correctly contend that the sole 
question is whether they are capable of effectively representing their 
clients, while often the representative of the jurisdiction contends that 
the court must balance this concern against other factors, such as 
what alternatives for representation exist or whether the defender is 
somehow in part responsible for the current situation.75  In this de-
bate, the power of a pronouncement from the Supreme Court focus-
 
 74. See, e.g., Dave Collins, Connecticut Public Defenders Worry About Budget 
Cuts, STAMFORD ADVOCATE, July 20, 2011, http://www.stamfordadvocate.com/news/ 
article/Conn-public-defenders-worry-about-budget-cuts-1475263.php; Eckholm, su-
pra note 61; Nicklaus Lovelady, County Wants to Cut Indigent Defense Costs, THE 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 12, 2011, http://www.chron.com/news/article/County-
wants-to-cut-indigent-defense-costs-2080732.php;  Allison Retka, Public Defender in 
Missouri Tells Court of its Sub-Par Lawyers, MISSOURI LAWYERS MEDIA, June 16, 
2011, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7992/is_20110616/ai_n57713 
123. 
 75. See, e.g., Unassigned Felony Cases Order, supra note 72 (noting that the pub-
lic defenders’ caseloads were excessive by any standards, but limiting the remedy 
granted due to public safety and administrative concerns), available at 
http://www.pdmiami.com/Order_on_motion_to_appoint_other_counsel.pdf; Arizona 
v. Lopez, No. CR-2007-1544, at 11–12 (noting that the state attorney requested that 
the court consider whether the public defender was responsible for the caseload 
problem by failing to hire an additional funded full-time attorney position). 
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ing on the duties of the defense lawyer to the client, with its implicit 
acknowledgment of the duty of the courts to ensure compliance with 
minimal norms, should not be underestimated.  Where practice 
standards and ethical rules are persuasive, the Supreme Court is au-
thoritative.  A constitutional right to advice cannot be disregarded as 
setting a merely aspirational standard not truly attainable given the 
realities of the criminal court docket.76  Raising Padilla in the context 
of a caseload reduction motion should help to avoid the erroneous 
consideration of administrative concerns in caseload challenge deci-
sions to the detriment of the public defenders raising them.77 
Moreover, Padilla articulates a black letter requirement for defense 
lawyers, which prevents any argument over whether an attorney must 
act in a particular case.  Every attorney in every criminal case is re-
quired to investigate the applicability of severe collateral conse-
quences to their clients.  A public defender or office78 that cannot ful-
 
 76. It is noteworthy that in Padilla, twenty-seven State Attorneys General filed an 
amicus brief claiming that the Court should not require defense lawyers to investigate 
the impact of collateral consequences because to do so would increase the costs of 
indigent defense. See Brief for the State of Louisiana et. al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondent at 6 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1472 (2010) (No. 08-651)  (“The 
[collateral consequences] rule thus protects the state’s interest in an efficient justice 
system by preventing it from having to pay for counsel to advise defendants on a va-
riety of specialized collateral matters outside the sentencing court’s control. . . .”).  
The majority opinion tacitly rejected this argument. 
 77. Arizona v. Lopez, No. CR-2007-1544, at 11 (“The financial implications and 
logistics of identifying, appointing and paying attorneys outside the Public Defender’s 
Office to handle any case in which defendants are left without counsel will have to be 
addressed by the County and will not be considered by the Court in its analysis of the 
legal and factual issues presented in these cases.”). 
 78. Public defenders are not the only providers of indigent defense.  A large 
number of individuals who are entitled to defense representation at public expenses 
are represented by court-appointed lawyers. See Thomas H. Cohen, Who’s Better at 
Defending Criminals?:  Does Type of Defense Attorney Matter in Terms of Produc-
ing Favorable Case Outcomes, at 3 n.1 (2011) (“While there are no nationwide statis-
tics on the prevalence of these three forms of indigent defense, a survey of indigent 
defense systems in the nation’s 100 most populous counties conducted in 2000 
showed public defenders handling 82%, assigned counsel 15%, and contract attor-
neys 3% of the 4.2 million cases disposed of in these counties.”) (citation omitted), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1876474.  These law-
yers are not part of a large, institutional defender office, and thus the implementation 
of Padilla poses different challenges to these indigent defenders.  Although court-
appointed counsel exert greater control over their caseloads than public defenders, 
they often lack access to the experts and training materials cultivated in institutional 
defender settings.  While I cannot detail the approach in this article, I would suggest 
that, much like public defenders and caseload challenges, court-appointed counsel 
should utilize Padilla to pursue the resources necessary to aid in its full implementa-
tion, including, on an individual case basis, seeking the right to consult with experts 
regarding relevant collateral consequences. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, PADILLA V. 
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fill this requirement because of an overwhelming caseload is entitled 
to redress. 
CONCLUSION 
By cutting through the collateral consequence/criminal sentence 
distinction, Padilla authorizes defense lawyers to focus on what is im-
portant to the client, rather than subject lawyers to formalistic limita-
tions on their role.  The duty articulated in Padilla is, at its core, a 
mandate to get to know one’s client and focus the defense not solely 
on the criminal sentence but on those consequences of a conviction, 
sentence included, that are the most severe and critical to the client.  
In this way, Padilla has enormous power to bring about transforma-
tive changes in how the defense bar practices.  But Padilla does not 
impose all of the change it should bring about.  It is a tool, and like all 
tools, it is only as useful as its user.  The decision resides with the de-
fense lawyers as to whether they choose to maximize Padilla. 
The defense bar’s response to Padilla thus far shows a promising 
recognition of the case’s import.  With the aid of expert organizations, 
defenders have taken significant steps to ensure compliance with the 
mandate that clients be advised of immigration consequences, includ-
ing producing trainings on immigration consequences,79 cultivating in-
house expertise to assist defender organizations,80 and developing 
primers to assist defense lawyers in determining the application of a 
 
KENTUCKY, THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM, ONE YEAR LATER 8 
(2011) [hereinafter N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N] available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report 
/uploads/PadillaCrimCtsCJOReportFINAL6.15.11.pdf (“For defense counsel who do 
not have the benefit of in-house immigration expertise and resources . . . expert fees 
for immigration experts may be necessary.”).  Additionally, on a systemic basis, coun-
sel should seek a system-wide training and consulting system on collateral conse-
quences, like the Immigration Impact Unit, which was established within the Massa-
chusetts Committee on Public Counsel Services and provides training and case con-
consultation on immigration issues in criminal cases not just for public defenders, but 
also for the court-appointed counsel (called bar advocates). See Immigration Impact 
Unit, COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL, http://www.publiccounsel.net/practice_areas/ 
immigration/immigration_index.html. 
 79. See, e.g., NACDL PADILLA IN PRACTICE TRAINING (SEPT. 7, 2010) 
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/9417685#utm_campaign=synclickback&source=http:/
/ctpublicdefendertraining.com/webinars.htm&medium=9417685. 
 80. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 78, at 4 (“Several institutional defender of-
fices have in-house immigration experts who provide direct advice and support to de-
fense counsel on immigration issues . . . .  Several of these offices report hiring addi-
tional staff after Padilla in order to meet the increased demand for immigration 
advice.”). 
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consequence in a particular case.81  Further steps need to be taken to 
extend Padilla to other collateral consequences.82  Steps suggested by 
knowledgeable academics and commentators include the develop-
ment of charts and databases of collateral consequences, including 
summaries of their applicability, as well as trainings and checklists.83  
But these steps, while positive, go to the direct implementation of Pa-
dilla, not necessarily the broader change in the focus of the defense 
function. 
As the defense bar proceeds to implement Padilla and designs tools 
to help with this effort, the starting place should be the encourage-
ment of substantive dialogue between the defense lawyer and her cli-
ent to determine not just whether a collateral consequence applies, 
but which of the applicable consequences are most important to the 
individual impacted.84  And perhaps most importantly, defense law-
yers, particularly public defense lawyers, must take steps to ensure 
that they can comply with Padilla.  They must reduce their caseloads 
and ensure that they can take the time to focus, not just on the crimi-
nal penalty, but on the consequences of conviction that are the most 
severe for and important to their clients.  Padilla provides critical mo-
tivation and support for taking this step. 
 
 81. See, e.g., Quick Reference Chart for Determining Immigration Consequences 
of Common New York Offenses, IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT, http://www. 
immigrantdefenseproject.org/docs/06_QuickReferenceChartforNewYorkStateOffens
es.pdf. 
 82. See Chin, supra note 20, at 684–90. 
 83. See id.; Smyth, supra note 13, at 834–35. 
 84. One of the suggestions offered by Professor Chin is the creation a checklist of 
questions to be posed to a client, including: 
• Whether the client is a citizen of the United States; 
• How the client is employed; 
• Whether the client owns firearms; 
• Whether the client receives any public benefits; 
• Whether the client holds any licenses, permits, or government contracts; and  
• Whether the client has any questions based on the categorical advisement. 
Chin, supra note 20, at 690.  To achieve the goals I have suggested, a tool like this 
should be evaluated not only for its efficacy at getting the needed information to de-
termine the applicability of a consequence, but also for its ability to ascertain the im-
portance of the consequence to the client, both presently and in the future.  To this 
end, questions should be open-ended to encourage a narrative and not simply a yes 
or no answer.  For example, a lawyer should ask what a client’s immigration status is 
rather than whether the client is a citizen of the United States.  The lawyer should 
also address both future prospects and current situations, e.g., not just “what do you 
do for a living,” but also “what do you want to do for a living?” See Smyth, supra 
note 13, at 834 (“Attorneys must build relationships with their clients to discover cli-
ents’ risk-related statuses, priorities, and goals and empower them to make informed 
decisions.”). 
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Whether Padilla will extend this far is a question that only the de-
fense bar can answer.  If defense lawyers wait for an external force to 
hand them resources or force them to focus on the concerns most im-
portant to the client, Padilla will likely be relegated to vague warnings 
about consequences and their indeterminate nature.  If defense law-
yers pick up the mantle of Padilla and use its mandate to fight for 
more time with clients, reduced caseloads, and better resources, Pa-
dilla could transform the way persons accused of crimes are treated 
by the criminal justice system.  Padilla thus stands as both an incredi-
ble challenge to and opportunity for the defense bar to decide its own 
future. 
 
